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Cover -- Half Title -- Series -- Title -- Copyright -- Contents -- Epigraph -- Acknowledgements -- Introduction -- Property and Justice -- Original Acquisition: Connecting Property to Personhood -- Beyond Private Property -- Natural Rights and Social Conventions -- The Not-So-Minimum Content of Natural Rights -- The Theory -- 1 The Form of Justice -- Introduction -- The Circumstances of Justice and Deontology -- Individual Rights -- Compossibility -- Conclusion -- 2 The Substance of Justice -- Introduction -- The Right to Non-Interference in Our Non-Interfering Actions -- The One and Only Right -- Kinds of Interference -- Self-Ownership -- Necessity -- Conclusion -- 3 Original Acquisition -- Introduction -- Use, Exclusion, and Ownership -- Extended Activity -- Contra Labour-Mixing -- Abandonment and Transfer -- Conclusion -- 4 The Commons -- Introduction -- Liberty and Property After Ostrom -- Public Property -- Collective Property -- Conclusion -- 5 The Limits to Appropriation -- Introduction -- Necessity, Revisited -- Against Engrossment -- Against Intellectual Property -- Intellectual Property as Ownership of Ideas -- Intellectual Property as Usufruct -- Conclusion -- 6 Against the Proviso -- Introduction -- Nozick's Proviso -- The Egalitarian Proviso -- Internal Accounts of the Provisos -- Conclusion -- 7 Intentions and Conventions -- Introduction -- Intentions: Public and Private -- Conventions: Constitutive and Regulative -- Natural Rights and Social Change -- Conclusion -- Conclusion: Natural Rights and Liberal Politics -- Index.

Abstract
In this paper I criticize a growing movement within public policy circles that self-identifies as neoliberal. The issue I take up here is the sense in which the neoliberal label signals a turn away from libertarian political philosophy. The are many import ant figures in this movement, but my focus here will be on Will Wilkinson of the Niskanen Center, not least because he has most prolifically written against libertarian political philosophy. Neoliberals oppose the idea that the rights that libertarianism claims people have are useful guides for making the world a freer place because they forestall too much governmental/democratic political action that they purport to be necessary for increasing freedom. Wilkinson mistakenly takes libertarianism to be a set of ideal public policies for achieving a perfectly free society. If it were, he would be right to turn away from it. But placing rights to freedom at the center of their theory of justice does not commit libertarians to an all-or-nothing approach to political change. Consequences and strategy matter – particularly in a non-ideal world – without abandoning the idea that each individual has a right to freedom. In mistaking libertarian moral claims as a set of policy prescriptions, Wilkinson complains that idealistic policy prescriptions not only fail to take account of how those who disagree will respond to such policies if implemented, but also thereby undermines the justice of those policies in the first instance. Wilkinson proposes that change in the direction of freedom must go through the proper channels of actually-existing democratic legitimacy. It as this stage that Wilkinson's project comes into direct conflict with libertarianism. Whilst libertarianism is not committed to any particular method of creating a free society under non-ideal conditions, and therefore does not rule out democratic political activism as one among many means of doing that, it cannot be committed to the permanence of democratic political authority, and this is what Wilkinson's neoliberalism demands above all else. It turns out that Foucault's characterization of neoliberalism long ago is still accurate to Wilkinson's own view: that neoliberalism is not about creating a society of free individuals, it is about designing the state apparatus in ways that are inspired by the workings of free society – it is about legitimizing the chains, not breaking them. Neoliberalism is not a pragmatic alternative to libertarianism, but rather a gross misapplication of it.

Hugo Grotius a montré qu'un système fondé sur la propriété privée pouvait émerger, avec justice, en s'appuyant sur l'accord de ceux qui y vivent. Il a adopté ce point de vue parce qu'il ne voyait pas comment les droits, prétendument primitifs, d'utiliser les ressources naturelles dont dispose chacun à l'état de nature pouvait à eux seuls justifier une propriété privée pleine et entière. Plus précisément, le droit d'exclure des tiers de la propriété de son bien, qu'il considérait comme essentiel à la propriété privée, ne pouvait pas être justifié par l'ensemble des droits originaires qu'il pensait appartenir à des personnes se trouvant à l'état de nature. De nombreux théoriciens des droits naturels ont suivi Grotius dans cette erreur. La nécessité d'un commun accord peut être évité si l'on reconnaît que tout droit d'usage comporte nécessairement un droit d'exclure d'autres. De plus, le droit d'exclusion, au sens large, qui caractérise la pleine propriété libérale peut, dans certains cas, être rattaché aux droits d'usage du fait que ces utilisations sont elles-mêmes très vastes. La propriété privée peut donc émerger par un usage unilatéral, sans recours à un commun accord. Le récit des droits naturels de Grotius ne devrait donc pas être utilisé pour soutenir les approches théoriques du contrat social en matière de propriété et de justice.